A Marinha do Brasil frente ao sistema de salvaguardas nucleares da Agência Internacional de Energia Atômica: suas particularidades e reflexos sobre o Programa de Desenvolvimento de Submarinos

Abstract

The need to contain the proliferation of nuclear weapons originates at the end of World War II (II WW) in the face of the catastrophic results of the only two atomic bomb launches in history, carried out by the United States of America (USA), over Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As a relevant consequence of these facts, the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons emerged, leading to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in 1957. Four years later, the IAEA established its unprecedented system of nuclear safeguards. In parallel, the Brazilian Nuclear Program (BNP) was born, with the outstanding participation of Admiral Alvaro Alberto in the development of nuclear energy in the country. Using Alvaro Alberto’s vision of the future, the Brazilian Navy (BN) has been developing its two main programs in the nuclear area, the Navy Nuclear Program and the Submarine Development Program (PROSUB). It is within this context that this work was built, considering that the logic that runs through its chapters is based on the dichotomy between the need to strengthen the IAEA Safeguards System and the advances that BN has been collecting on the evolution of PROSUB. The national and international legislation surrounding this dichotomy presents an interesting theoretical debate, centered on articles that discuss possible differences between what is contained in the terms of the Information Circular (INFCIRC)/153 of the IAEA, which is based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the main legal instrument of the Brazilian State in terms of nuclear safeguards, the “Quadripartite” Agreement, published by the IAEA INFCIRC/435. On the part of PROSUB, its particularities are explored, associating them with those of the Brazilian State, which is already enough to position Brazil as a singular country among its peers. The other side of the dichotomy is permeated by the historical evolution of the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime, closely followed by the BNP. Based on the details of both sides oh this dichotomy, the potential impacts on the nuclear assets of PROSUB are presented in the case of an eventual adhesion to the Additional Protocol (AP), by the Brazilian State. For the analysis of these impacts, a dedicated study is carried out on the origins of the AP and the technical issues surrounding its main legal reference, IAEA INFCIRC/540. Thus, the work concludes that Brazil’s unique position, based on its commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, associated with the fact that it is currently the only State to launch a robust state program, as is the case with PROSUB, constitute a unique opportunity for the IAEA to strengthen its nuclear safeguards system, through the unprecedented establishment of special safeguards procedures, referenced, in the foreground, by Article 13 of INFCIRC/435. This is a relevant issue, both for the IAEA and for Brazil, which will, in due course, have its National Defense component of greatest strategic value, in protecting the Brazilian wealth in the Blue Amazon, the conventional nuclear-powered submarine, the main product of PROSUB