A relação de causalidade entre doutrina militar e tecnologia : o aprestamento dos submarinos estadunidenses entre 1922 e 1941

Abstract

In the course of generating technologies for military use, it is necessary not only built military equipment, but also to analyze its tactical and strategic uses. In the military field, the operationalization of technologies occurs through the elaboration of doctrines. The causal relationship between technology and doctrine can be described as mutual dependence. The doctrine performs the role of supporting a technological innovation to find its rightful place in a nation's weapons pool. Considering these factors, we intend to understand the role of doctrine as a tool to identify the operational implications of such advances to implement changes in military institutions in order to effectively internalize the technological advances. This research aims to answer the following question: were the technological advances implemented in U.S. submarines, in the period from 1922 to 1941, covered by a doctrine that provided the necessary readiness to have them employed in the Pacific during the Second World War? Based on the theoretical framework of the doctrines´ component elements, and the implementation of military doctrines theoretical framework, based on the factors of cultural coherence, authority and credibility, the research was supported. We analyze the technical evolution of submarine naval power, up to its employment in the First World War and the resulting lessons learned by the United States Navy (USN), in light of the influence of “Mahanian” naval thought and the idealistic concept of freedom of navigation on the seas. Through the observation of how the elaboration and implementation of the submarine doctrine in the USN occurred, between 1922 and 1941, and on the examination of comparison between the selected theoretical composition with the methodological practice of the formulation, review and dissemination of that doctrine, the research concludes that the diagnosis of the U.S. naval culture, in the interwar period, was one of conservatism averse to constructive criticism, limiting the understanding of the submarine weapon's potential to cause damage and, consequently, its readiness, at the beginning of the Second World War. This is mostly descriptive and contextual research, based on bibliographic and documentary analysis. As for the justification, this research intends to contribute to Strategic Studies by analyzing the role of doctrine in allowing the conversion of potential power, offered by technologies, into real military power