Dominância rápida com "choque e pavor": análise da estratégia aérea na Operação Iraqi Freedom em 2003

Abstract

The dissertation in question presents a detailed analysis of the "Rapid Dominance" doctrine and its application during Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003-2011) by the American Armed Forces. The central objective is to investigate whether the doctrine, which incorporates the concept of "Shock and Awe," was truly implemented and effective in air strikes during the troop advance from March to April 2003. The academic text is structured into five chapters, beginning with an introduction to the use of aircraft in warfare, highlighting the evolution of its strategic role from World War I to the introduction of the "Rapid Dominance" doctrine. This doctrine aims for the rapid submission of the enemy through massive and precise attacks, destabilizing the adversary both physically and psychologically. In the second chapter, the theoretical foundations of the "Rapid Dominance" doctrine and John Warden's Strategic Paralysis are described, proposing the "Five Rings System," where the center (leadership) is the most critical target. The third chapter provides a summary of Operation Iraqi Freedom, focusing on air strikes and the practical application of the studied theories. The operation is historically contextualized, with the trigger being the attacks of September 11, 2001. It is emphasized that the American strategy sought a quick victory with minimal casualties, using precise air strikes to dismantle Saddam Hussein's government. The fourth chapter analyzes specific cases of the operation in light of the presented theories. Among the cases studied are the bombing of Dora Farms, the attempt to dominate the Jabal Sanam elevation, the capture of the Highway 1 bridge, fratricide in Nasiriyah, and the failure of the Apache helicopter attack. The analysis reveals that, despite the overall success of the operation, there were several failures in the application of the doctrines due to insufficient intelligence, tactical coordination, and operational planning. Finally, the conclusion synthesizes the findings, stating that although Operation Iraqi Freedom was a military success, the full application of the "Rapid Dominance" doctrine was hindered by various operational and technological factors. The dissertation highlights the crucial importance of precise intelligence and efficient coordination for the effective implementation of modern military strategies.