Comando e controle nas operações conjuntas: uma análise doutrinária à luz da Guerra das Maldivas

Abstract

This dissertation analyzes the importance of Command and Control (C2) in the success of joint operations, using the 1982 Falklands War as a case study. The work examines the C2 structures employed by Argentine and British forces, comparing them with the doctrine of the Brazilian Armed Forces. The methodology adopted is a comparative argumentative approach between theory (doctrine) and reality (practice), through investigative research of various military publications, books, and reports, combining document analysis and case study. The study seeks to identify convergences and divergences between doctrinal concepts and the reality observed in the conflict, from the perspective of Command and Control in Joint Operations. The study analyzes the challenges faced by both sides, such as the lack of integration among Argentine forces and the absence of a Joint Force Commander in the British Theater of Operations. The research reveals how deficiencies in C2 can seriously compromise operational performance, while a structured and adaptable system can overcome significant challenges and contribute decisively to the success of operations. The lessons learned from this conflict continue to influence the development of new military doctrines and the improvement of Command and Control Systems (C2S). Thus, the study concludes that an efficient and effective C2S is a factor that significantly enhances success in modern warfare. Furthermore, technological advancement amplifies C2 capabilities, consequently increasing integration and coordination among Component Forces (CF).