“Continous at Sea Deterrent”: análise da estratégia nuclear do Reino Unido

Abstract

Nuclear strategy has been essential for maintaining global peace since the end of World War II. The destruction caused by the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki not only ended the conflict but also marked the beginning of a new era of caution and prevention in the use of nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, the constant threat of a preemptive nuclear strike created an atmosphere of mutual distrust and fear among global powers. In this context, the ability to conduct a second strike, even after a devastating first strike, emerged as a crucial component for nuclear deterrence. The construction of the USS George Washington, the first nuclear-powered submarine armed with nuclear warheads launched by long-range ballistic missiles, revolutionized the existing nuclear deterrence strategy. This submarine ensured the possibility of nuclear retaliation due to its constant presence and difficult detection at sea. From this innovation emerged the strategy of "Continuous At Sea Deterrent" (CASD), which involves the continuous deployment of nuclear submarines on patrol, ready for a nuclear counterattack. This approach not only stabilized tensions during the Cold War but also allowed for a controlled reduction of nuclear arsenals while maintaining a sense of security among the countries that possessed these fleets. The aim of this work is to analyze how the United Kingdom understands and applies the CASD nuclear deterrence strategy. For this analysis, a case study methodology was used, focusing on the UK's perspective on CASD.