Essequibo, San Andrés e providência: ensinamentos obtidos através de uma análise comparativa de dois níveis entre as crises

Abstract

The paper analyzes two territorial disputes in Latin America: the crisis between Venezuela and Guyana over the Essequibo region from 1840 to 2023 and the maritime territorial dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia from 1928 to 2023. Using Robert D. Putnam's Two-Level Game Theory, the research explores how domestic and international pressures influence negotiations in these two conflicts, generating elements to be used in a comparative approach. To this end, the study analyzes historical events, political and economic pressures, and the strategies adopted by each country involved. The ideas extracted from the comparative analysis between the crises, from the perspective of Putnam's Theory, then allow us to answer the question posed at the beginning of the study: how could Brazil play a constructive diplomatic role, mediating and supporting peaceful solutions, while developing prevention and rapid response strategies to prevent similar conflicts from threatening its interests or national sovereignty? Finally, lessons learned are suggested, such as: the need to strengthen regional alliances, the use of international legal mechanisms, better military preparation and deterrence capacity, combined with the maintenance of nationalism and proactive diplomacy.