Punição, sofrimento e resiliência: O Poder Aéreo na Guerra da Ucrânia (2022-2024) da perspectiva coercitiva de Pape

Abstract

The Russo-Ukrainian War, which began in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and intensified in 2022 with Russia's large-scale invasion, has become one of the most devastating conflicts in Europe since World War II. This study analyzes the use of Russian Air Power from 2022 to 2024, utilizing Robert A. Pape's (1996) Theory of Coercive Air Strategies as the theoretical basis. The research investigates Moscow's use of ballistic and cruise missiles, drones, air defense systems, and electronic warfare, as well as their impacts on the maritime environment. The analysis reveals that, contrary to initial expectations, Russia failed to establish air superiority over Ukraine. Ukrainian resistance, widely supported by Western allies through the provision of intelligence, advanced weaponry, and military systems, significantly contributed to maintaining a contested airspace. The investigation details various tactics employed by Russia, such as attacks on critical infrastructure and the use of kamikaze drones. It explores the effectiveness of these actions within Pape's theoretical framework. The results indicate that the Russian air strategy, predominantly based on Punishment, failed to achieve its coercive objectives. The study also reveals that various tools, including Air Power, contributed to Ukraine's unlikely prominence in a spatially limited maritime environment like the Black Sea. The research concludes that, although the Russian air strategy of Punishment inflicted significant damage on the civilian population, presumably in retaliation for significant naval losses, it failed to force a political change in Ukraine. Furthermore, the study highlights the importance of Western military aid received by Ukraine in sustaining its war effort in a prolonged conflict and its resilience and innovation in adapting commercial technologies to gain new military capabilities.