Segunda Intifada (2000-2005): as ações de guerra irregular na visão do insurgente

Abstract

In recent decades, irregular warfare has gained prominence compared to regular or conventional wars. Insurgent groups are challenging the monopoly of force held by states. In the Middle East, this form of warfare has grown since World War II (1939-1945), with the use of guerrilla tactics and suicide bombings. This study aims to analyze whether the actions of the Palestinian group Al-Fatah during conflicts with Israel between 2000 and 2005, known as the Second Intifada, align with the theoretical model of counterinsurgency. The focus is on the four laws and eight steps of French Colonel David Galula’s theory, in the perspective of the insurgent group. An investigative research approach was employed to create this work. After analysis, Al-Fatah’s strategies, aimed at gaining popular support and creating an unsustainable environment for Israeli forces, adhered to the Galula’s theory as presented in the study. Furthermore, as part of this investigation, the theory was confronted with reality. Thus, this dissertation provides insights into the complexities of irregular warfare during the Second Intifada, particularly for the Brazilian Navy (MB), informing unconventional combat techniques for territorial defense readiness both nationally and internationally.